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Rethinking growth strategies in LICs: the need to 
achieve strategic planning and political stability 
Jonathan'Di'John' Nicolas'Meisel'
The Problem: Most policy debates on industrial policy 
are technical, apolitical and ahistorical 
Industrial" strategies" can" be" seen" as" specific" sets" of" policy" tools" designed" to" develop" new"
capabilities" that" will" shift" the" economy" from" less" sophisticated" sectors" with" lower"
productivity" to" more" sophisticated" sectors" with" higher" productivity." This" process" is"
generally"known"as"structural" transformation."Why"these" transformations"matter" is" simply"
because" ‘poor" countries" become" rich" ones" by" producing" what" rich" countries" produce’"
(Rodrik,"2010)."""
In" the" context" of" late" development," which" is" inherently" risky" and" lacks" private" longFrun"
financing"organisations,"advocates"of"state" intervention"point"to"the"benefits" that" industrial"
policy" can" have" in" inducing" learning" and" technology" acquisition" (Amsden," 1989," 2001;"
Wade,"1990;"Cimoli"et"al.,"2009)."This" literature"has"provided"an" important"contribution"by"
highlighting" the" salience" of" targeted" subsidisation," or" rentFcreation," in" driving" the" late"
industrialization"process.1"It"has"also"emphasised"that"effective"industrial"policy"is"essentially"
a" system" of" ‘carrots" and" sticks’," in" which" continued" privileged" subsidisation" needs" to" be"
conditional" on" performance" criteria," especially" improvements" in" productivity" (Amsden,"
2001)."
While"the"purely"economic"arguments"for"the"benefits"of"state"intervention"may"be"accepted,"
too"little"attention"is"paid"to"where"the"power"to"mobilise"resources,"implement"policies"and"
prioritise"policy"goals"comes"from"in"the"first"place"(Kohli,"2004).""As"a"result,"developmental"
state"analyses"do"not"explain"why"similar"types"of"industrial"policy"can"fail"in"many"contexts."
Moreover," technical" policy" advice" in" this" view" fails" to" explain" why" the" forms" of" effective"
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
1"Such" policies" include:" vertical" policies" to" select" strategic" targets" (winners)" and" concomitant" nationalisations,"
high"import"tariffs"followed"by"import"licensing"regimes,"selective"and"subsidised"credit"access,"tax"exemptions,"
favourable"access" to" foreign"exchange,"regulations"on"national"content"requirements,"stimulation"of" technology"
transfer"and"complementary"FDI,"and"export"subsidies"(Khan"and"Blankenburg,"2009:"359)."
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industrial" policy" differ" so"much" across" countries," why" particular" industrial" policies," even"
when" effective" in" one" country," are" not" transferable" across" political" systems" (Rodrik" and"
Subramanian,"2003),"and"why""some"sectors"perform"better"than"others"within-countries"(Di"
John,"forthcoming)."
Based"partly"on"the"failure"of"many"countries"to"effectively"design"and"implement"industrial"
policies,"mainstream"policy"advice"does"not"promote"the"use"of"industrial"policy,"especially"
when"it"concerns" low"income"countries."Advocates"of" laissezFfaire"suggest" that"centralized,"
interventionist" and" discretionary" industrial" policies" have" led" to" corruption" and" cronyism,"
which"have,"in"turn,"hindered"growthFenhancing"competition"(e.g."Krueger,"1974).""
Even"when" it" is" acknowledged" that," in" theory," successful" state"management" of" industrial"
policy"might" have"worked" in" a" handful" of" countries," especially" in"Northeast"Asia" (World"
Bank"1997),"the"standard"advice"to"subFSaharan"African"economies"would"be"“not"to"try"this"
at" home”" since" the" capacity" to" effectively" administer" subsidies," export" “contests”" and"
investment" coFordination" is" generally" lacking." Otherwise," the" proponents" of" liberalisation"
would"argue"that"there"would"not"be"so"many"infant"industries"that"failed"to"“grow"up”."""
Inherent" in"this"reasoning"is"that"effective"industrialFpolicy"states"are"“idiosyncratic”"forms"
of"late"development"and"therefore"unlikely"to"be"replicable"in"other"contexts"whereas"more"
decentralised," liberal" forms" of" capitalist" development" represent" a"more" natural" fit." In" this"
perspective," economic" liberalisation"becomes" a"pragmatic" ‘secondFbest’" solution" in" light" of"
the" supposed" weakness" of" state" bureaucracies" that" cannot" avoid" the" dangers" of" political"
capture" and" thus" result" in" inadequate" and" poorly" targeted" resource" mobilisation" efforts,"
which"have"undermined"so"many"industrial"policy"initiatives"in"the"past."
There"are"several"problems"with"this"neoFliberal"argument."First,"there"is"little"crossFcountry"
or" timeFseries" evidence" that" accelerations" in" the" growth" trajectory" of" countries" have" been"
preceded"by"wideFranging"economic"liberalization"(Rodrik"2004)."Second,"comparative"regional"
evidence"suggests"that"where"liberalisation"reforms"have"been"most"pronounced"(i.e.,"Latin"
America" and" subFSaharan" Africa)," manufacturing" performance" has" been" disappointing"
(MacMillan"and"Rodrik,"2011)."While"the"state"in"many"African"economies"may"have"failed"
to" generate" and" implement" growthFenhancing" regulatory" structures," market" liberalization"
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does" not" eliminate" the" market" failures" and" risks" of" late" development" that" justified" state"
intervention"in"the"first"place."Third,"the"idea"that"controlling"corruption"or"more"generally"
introducing" ‘good"governance’"reforms" is"central" to" improving"growth"(World"Bank,"1997)"
has" very" little" empirical" support" (Khan" and" Jomo," 2000;" Svensson," 2005)." Thus," the" key"
analytical"challenge"is"to"explain"why"some"countries"are"able"to"create"more"developmental"
outcomes"in"the"context"of"‘clientelism’"and"corruption"while"other"states"do"not."
While" the" concerns" raised" by" neoFliberals" are" legitimate," they" do" not" apply" only" to"
“industrial" policy.”" Indeed" many" governments" have" misused" monetary" and" financial"
regulatory"policy," infrastructure"policy,"or"education"policy."But" few"analysts"would"argue"
that,"as"a"result,"governments"should"abandon"the"use"of"such"policies"(Stiglitz"et"al.,"2013:"7).""
It" is" therefore" imperative" to"understand" the" circumstances"under"which" industrial"policies"
will"work,"and"the"forms"of" industrial"policy"that"are"appropriate"for"countries" in"different"
stages"of"development"and"with"different"political"and"economic"institutions.""
Moreover," because" fiscal" resources" and" implementation" capacity" can" be" limited,"
governments" need" to" prioritise" and" decide"which" particular" sector" and" its" accompanying"
infrastructure" that" they" should" improve" or"where" they" should" optimally" locate" the" public"
services" to" make" those" success" stories" happen." Scarcity" of" state" resources" and" competing"
demands" on" those" resources" imply" that" government" leaders," in" conjunction"with" privateF"
and"publicFsector"managers,"need"to"make"difficult"choices"with"regard"to"which"sectors"to"
develop"and"how"to"effectively"monitor"them."
Taking political economy seriously  
The" failure" of"many" governments" to" design" and" implement" industrial" policy" needs" to" be"
taken"seriously."Neither"the"neoFliberal"nor"the"developmentalFstate"literature"makes"politics"
central"to"an"understanding"of"the"variation"and"change"in"state"capacity"to"intervene"in"the"
economy" in" growthFenhancing" ways." The" main" problem" of" political" economy" is" to"
understand" the" relationships" between" the" two" main" factors" that" influence" the" political"
survival"of"leaders:"a)"maintaining"a"nonFviolent"political"order"and"b)"promoting"economic"
development"(including"structural"transformation"and"employment"creation)."
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The"establishment"of"political"order"and"peace,"as"argued"by"North"et"al"(2007),"requires"the"
creation"of"incentives"for"groups"to"compete"for"resources"through"nonFviolent"mechanisms."
The" principal" solution" throughout" history" to" the" classic" Hobbesian" problem" of" endemic"
violence" is" the" creation"of"what" can"be" called" limited-access-orders" (as"opposed" to" the"much"
rarer" open" access" orders," which" characterise" advanced" market" economies)." " The" limited"
access" order" creates" limits" on" the" access" to" valuable" political" and" economic" functions" as" a"
way"to"generate"rents.2""
In"this"model,"the"ruling"coalition"creates"opportunities"and"order"by"limiting"to"elite"groups"
the" access" to" valuable" resourcesFFland," labour" and" capitalFFor" access" to" and" control" of"
valuable" activitiesFFsuch" as" contract" enforcement," property" rights" enforcement," trade,"
worship"and"education.""When"powerful"individuals"and"groups"become"privileged"insiders"
and" thus" possess" rents" relative" to" those" individuals" and" groups" excluded" (and" since," in"
addition,"violence" threatens"or"reduces" those"rents)," such"a"privileged"position" induces"the"
‘privileged"insiders’"to"cooperate"with"the"coalition"in"power"rather"than"to"fight"it.""In"effect,"
limited"access"orders"create"a"credible"commitment"among"elites"3"that"they"will"not"fight"one"
another."
While" political" order" is" a" necessary" condition" for" political" survival," it" is" generally" not"
sufficient." " This" brings" us" to" the" other" important" role" of" subsidies" and" rents," which" is" to"
induce" learning"and" late"development,"as"emphasised"by"developmental" state" theorists" (as"
discussed"above).""Thus,"the"role"of"subsidies"and"rents"has"a"dual"role,"as"seen"in"Figure"1."
The"key" issue" in" the"political" economy"of" industrial"policy" is" to" explain"how"and"why" the"
process" of" maintaining" political" order" affects" economic" growth" through" an" interactive"
process."The-danger-for-most-low6income-countries-is-that-the-deployment-of-rents-and-subsidies-will-
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
2"‘Rents’"refer"to"the"‘excess"incomes’,"or"the"‘proportion"of"earnings"in"excess"of"the"minimum"amount"needed"to"
attract"a"worker" to"accept"a"particular" job"or"a" firm"to"enter"a"particular" industry’" (Milgrom"and"Roberts"1992,"
269)."The"most"common"form"of"rent"creation"is"the"establishment"of"a"monopoly"and"the"rents"earned"from"such"
a"market" structure" are"ultimately"based"on" the" state" sanctioning" and"defending" the"property" rights" associated"
with"the"monopoly."
"
3"Elites"can" include:"a)" those" in"possession"of"valued"assets" in"agriculture,"manufacturing"and"services" (i.e.," the"
main" capitalists);"b)" those"who"wield" substantial"power"over" the"distribution"and"allocation"of"property" rights"
(such" as" traditional" chiefs," landlords," regional" political" leaders," warlords);" c)" those" who" possess" authority" to"
bargain" on" behalf" of" rural" communities" or" organised" religious" communities" (e.g.," traditional" leaders," religious"
leaders);"and"d)"those"who"lead"political"organisations"(Di"John"and"Putzel"2009:"15)."
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degenerate- into- a- process- of- dysfunctional- cronyism-whereby- political- order- is-maintained- through-
networks-of-political-clientelism,-patronage-and-support-not-related-to-a-coherent-economic-strategy-or"
where-the-rents-deployed-are-not-conditional-upon-performance-criteria."""
 
Figure 1: the dual and interactive role of rents in the political economy of late 
development 
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There" is" indeed" very" little" analysis" as" to" how" lowFincome" countries" can" overcome" the"
dangers"of"most"rents"in"a"polity"being"disbursed"based"on"political"as"opposed"to"economic"
criteria."However,"if"elite"control"of"rents"is"a"central"feature"of"asset"ownership"patterns"in"
less" developed" countries" (LDCs)" and" if" we" recognise" that" there" is" a" wide" and" diverging"
variation"in"longFrun"growth"among"these"countries,"then"an"important"issue"for"the"political"
economy"of"development"is"to"explain"why"it"is"the"case"that,"in"some"political"systems,"elites"
are- compelled" to" increase" capital" accumulation" and" productivity" in" order" to"maintain" their"
privileges," and" in" many" other" contexts" elites" can" maintain" their" privileges" without- being-
compelled"to"generate""investments"that"enhance"output"growth"and"productivity."
Dual-Track Growth Strategies and their relevance to the 
design of industrial policy in late developers 
If"we" take" the"problem"of"political"economy"seriously," then" the"main"problem"for"strategic"
planning" is" not" which" types" of" industrial" policies" are" inherently" better," but" how" state"
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control"violence"
Promote'economic'
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decisionFmakers"can"change"ineffective"policies"while"maintaining"nonFviolent"political"order."
In" fact,"most" influential"models"of"political"economy"point"mainly" to"how"politics" imposes"
constraints" on" policyFmaking" and" economic" outcomes" (Kohli," 1994;" North" et" al" 2007;"
Acemoglu"and"Robinson,"2012)."However,"these"models"often"neglect"the"role"that"political"
strategies" and" ideas" can" have" in" relaxing" longFstanding" constraints" (Rodrik," 2014)."
Historically,"the"role"of"ideas"and"political"and"economic"strategies"has"been"important"in"reF
shaping"how"the"powerful"view"their"own"interests"(ibid.)."""
One" important" example" of" how" this" can" be" achieved" is" the" soFcalled" dualFtrack" growth"
strategy."The"basic"idea"of"such"a""strategy"is"to"promote"an"emerging"dynamic"sector""where"
competition" and" riskFtaking" are" promoted" (Track" 1)" while" maintaining" the" bulk" of" the"
protected"and/or"distorted"sectors,"often"in"protected"agriculture"and"industrial"sectors,"with"
the"aim"of"reducing"social"tensions"and"maintaining"political"stability"(Track"2).""Examples"of"
Track" 1" strategies" are" export" processing" zones" and" industrial" parks" but" can" also" include"
sectors" perceived" by" the" government" (often" with" substantial" inputs" from" the"military)" as"
‘strategic’" in" terms"of"either"economic"security,"national"security"or"both" (WooFCummings,"
1999)." " Such" a" dualFtrack" strategy" postpones" confrontation" with" established" rentFseekers"
while" the" dynamic" sector" drives" competitive" diversification" of" the" economy" and" builds" a"
proFreform" political" constituency.4"The" main" challenge" of" this" strategy" is" to" insulate/ringF
fence"the"Track"1"sector"from"political"and"clientelist"predation"and"capture.""
In" general," this" strategy" can" be" seen" as" a" transitional" path" to" more" growthFenhancing"
institutional" reforms." This" approach" is" far" from" the" neoFliberal" advocacy" of" broadFbased"
economic"liberalisation."And"it"also"differs"from"the"developmental"state"advocacy"of"trying"
to"implement"South"KoreanFstyle"industrial"policy"in"every"sector."
There" is" a" range" of" countries" that" have" attempted" dualFtrack" strategies." These" include"
Malaysia," Indonesia," China," Mauritius" and" Brazil.5"" For" example," in" postF1978" China," the"
authorities" liberalized" agriculture" only" at- the- margin" while" keeping" the" planning" system"
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
4"Rodrik"(2005)""
"
5"On"Mauritius,"see"Findlay"and"Wellisz"(1993),"and"Rodrik"(1999)."On"Malaysia,"see"Bruton"(1992)"and"Di"John"
and" Putzel" (2009)." " On" China," see" Qian," (2003)." On" Indonesia," see" Flatters" and" Jenkins" (1986)." On" Brazil," see"
Geddes"(1994)"and"Di"John"(forthcoming)."
"
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intact."Farmers"were"allowed"to"sell"surplus"crops"freely"at"a"marketFdetermined"price"only"
after" they" had" fulfilled" their" obligations" to" the" state" under" the" state" order" system." This"
approach"allowed"for"increases"in"efficiency"while"minimising"social"disruptions"(Lau"et"al."
2000)."""
To"take"another"example,"in"Mauritius"creation"of"the"EPZs"in"textiles"in"the"1970s"and"1980s"
generated" new" opportunities" of" trade" and" employment" (for" women)," without" taking"
protection" away" from" the" importFsubstituting" groups" and" from" privileged"male" workers."
The"segmentation"of"labour"markets"was"particularly"crucial,"as"it"prevented"the"expansion"
of"the"EPZ"from"driving"wages"up"in"the"rest"of"the"economy,"and"thereby"disadvantaging"
importFsubstituting" industries."New"profit" opportunities"were" created"at" the"margin"while"
leaving"old"opportunities"undisturbed"(Rodrik,"1999).""
The-main-policy- implication" from" these"experiences" is" that" creating"one"or" two"growth"poles"
can"be"sufficient"to"accelerate"growth."At"the"same"time,"because"such"polices"do"not"attempt"
to" introduce" broadFbased" reforms," they" do" not" disrupt" patronage" structures" that," while"
generating"inefficiencies,"are"central"to"the"maintenance"of"political"order"and"stability."What"
is" noteworthy" in" all" of" these" cases" is" the" existence" of" strong" national" political" parties" and"
organizations" that" underpin" executive" authority." Strong," disciplined" national" parties" not"
only"enable"the"state"to"centralize"patronage"and"make"credible"bargains"and"side"payments"
to"contending"groups,"but"they"also"provide"a"focal"point"around"which"collective"action"and"
lobbying" can" occur" in" a" relatively" predictable" manner." Additionally," they" are" central" to"
providing" the" institutional"mechanisms" for"distributing"patronage" to" regional"elites"and" to"
important" political" constituencies" in" ways" that" either" prevent" challenges" to" authority" or"
maintain"the"cohesion"of"the"ruling"coalition."
There" is" significant" reasons" to" suggest" that" these" types" of" strategies" can" be" relevant" for"
Ethiopia." It" has" been" argued" that" one" of" the" main" impediments" to" expanding" the"
productivity"of"such"sectors"as"coffee"and"leather"is"the"inability"to"develop"larger"farms"and"
ranches"(Tenaw"et"al."2009;"Dinh,"2013)."This"deficiency"is"in"turn"likely"to"be"due"to"the"lack"
of"land"markets,"the"power"of"local"authorities"to"demand"high"land"taxes"for"the"expansion"
of" emerging" businesses," and" the" de- facto" traditional" access" to" land." Devising" strategies" to"
allow" for" greater" consolidation"of" land"along"with" the"provision"of" targeted" infrastructure"
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while" finding"mechanism"to"compensate" those"who"might"be"disadvantaged" in" the"process"
will"be"central"to"improving"productivity"and"export"growth"in"these"sectors."
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